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Abstract
This paper questions the eﬀectiveness of matching grants to cor-
rect for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of Bernheim general
neutrality result. Indeed this result suggests that the usual argument
that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising
from the existence of interjuridictional spillovers is an artifact of the
assumption that jurisdictions neglect the impact that their decisions
have on the federal budget. Relaxing this assumption and using a clas-
sical model where the arbitrage resulting from labor mobility implies
that redistribution has the properties of a public good, we ￿nd that
matching grants are relevant although much less eﬀective. We also ￿nd
that optimal matching rates are independent of the jurisdictions￿ choice
of policy variable contrarily to the case where jurisdictions ignore the
impact of their decisions on the federal budget.
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Redistributive programmes are the largest component of public expenditures
in most industrialised countries.1 With the ongoing process of integration
and the simultaneous devolution of tax and spending responsibilities to lower
level governments, many countries have become concerned about the sus-
tainability of redistributive programmes. Increasing labour mobility makes
redistribution more diﬃcult as each state seeks to limit immigration of the
poor and out-migration of the rich by setting low level of redistribution and
taxation.2
The present paper stands at the intersection of two lines of research.
In the ￿scal federalism literature (as in [12]) and textbook treatment (as
in [10]) one argument for intergovernmental transfers is to internalise the
externality arising from the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers either
through public good provision or labour mobility. To restore the Pareto-
optimal outcome, a system of matching grants from the federal government
to lower level of governments is needed. It means that local states determine
their expenditure levels and the federal government pays a fraction of the
costs.3
However a diﬀerent strand of literature on Ricardian equivalence as ex-
empli￿ed by [3] is very pessimistic about the capacity of a central govern-
ment to correct that kind of externalities and in particular to restore the
optimal provision of public good through tax-subsidy policies.4 One critical
assumption is whether agents take the central government tax-subsidy pol-
icy as parametric or not when optimising. Tax-subsidy are eﬀective when
agents select their policy to maximise their welfare, taking as given the pol-
1For the European Community in 1998 the average GDP share of all transfer spending
to individuals was 21.6 percent (see [2]).
2An excellent survey of the empirical studies of welfare migration is provided in [6].
See also [14] for a presentation of the redistribution and mobility issues in the European
context.
3Evidence on the importance of intergovernmental transfers in some federal countries
are provided in [7]. In the US, the federal government could bear 50-80 percent of the
cost of the AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) expenditures undertaken
by states. In 1996, the AFDC was replaced by a block grant programme (i.e., TANF),
but the food stamp programme and the Medicaid programme continued under a matching
system.
4The word Ricardian Equivalence was coined by [1], who argued that debt and ￿nance
are equivalent because intergenerational transfers could be oﬀset by private voluntary
transfers. This argument was indeed already presented by Ricardo who also expressed
scepticism about its empirical relevance.
1icy of the central government. This implies that they ignore the requirement
that the budget of the central government be balanced. The presumption
is that there are enough agents for each to ignore the eﬀects of their policy
on the government budget. With many agents, like individual taxpayers,
this is a reasonable assumption. However when there are few agents, like
regional jurisdictions in a federal system, then it is less legitimate to assume
that each has a negligible impact on government revenue. Then a simple
inference from Bernheim￿s equivalence result suggests that tax-subsidy pol-
icy becomes ineﬀective. This result has been established formally by [4] in
a ￿scal federalism context of public good provision without mobility. They
showed that matching grants are ineﬀective when jurisdictions see through
the federal budget and take into account the impact of their decision on it.
In this paper we use the classic model of [12] to question the eﬀect of
the so-called see through assumption on the eﬀectiveness of matching grant
in the context of redistribution with mobility. Regional social welfare func-
tions re￿ects some (unexplained) motive for redistribution. Redistribution
is similar to a public good since when labour is mobile, by arbitrage all
states will end up with the same equilibrium ￿welfare of the poor￿. A dis-
tinguishing feature of this framework is that redistribution interacts directly
with the working of the labour market as it aﬀe c t st h ea l l o c a t i o no ff a c t o r s
across states, the economic rent and the amount of output available.
A ￿rst result is that in this model of redistribution as a public good,
matching grants are not irrelevant even with see-through, although they
are much less eﬀective. The reason why matching grants are not neutral is
that acting to oﬀset the federal policy change is distortionary. Oﬀsetting
changes in the states￿ redistributive policies distort the allocation of labour
and aﬀects the labour supply of each state. By contrast in [3] labour supply
precedes contributions to the public goods (or in [4] is simultaneous) so that
oﬀsetting changes in contributions are not distortionary at all. To put it
diﬀerently, redistribution with mobility has also an impact on the labour
market which creates a second spillover between states through its eﬀects
on labour allocation which is not present in Bernheim￿s neutrality result.
Another ￿nding is that with see-through optimal matching grants are
independent of the states￿choice of policy variable. T h i si sar a t h e ru n e x -
pected result since it is well known from the tax competition literature (see
e.g. [8]), that diﬀerent decision variables lead to diﬀerent outcomes.5 Indeed
we show that when states ignore the impact of their decision on the federal
5This is analogue to the usual distinction in industrial organisation between Cournot
and Bertrand competition.
2budget (taking the federal policy as given) then tax competition requires
higher matching grants than bene￿t (expenditure) competition to restore
the ￿rst-best outcome. So it turns out that with see through this sensitivity
of the optimal matching grant completely disappears.
We develop our analysis in a set up where states are assumed to be
identical, and only symmetric Nash equilibria (among the states) are con-
sidered. This of course, rules out one of the key role of intergovernmental
transfers which is to correct for diﬀerences in ￿scal capacities or needs across
states. Our purpose in adopting this simplication is to ensure that matching
grants result solely from the need to internalise the externality arising from
the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers (i.e eﬃciency role of matching
grants).We also abstract from the risk sharing role of matching grants as in
[9] by assuming away uncertainty.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe
the basic framework. In section 3, we derive the Pareto optimal outcome
as a benchmark for the rest of the analysis. In section 4 we analyse the
eﬀect of the see-through assumption on the optimal matching grants when
states compete in bene￿t levels. In section 5, it is assumed instead that
states compete in taxes. The concluding section summarises the results and
discusses possible implications.
2T h e f r a m e w o r k
T h ep r e s e n t a t i o no ft h em o d e lw i l lb eb r i e f . 6 A federation is composed of
k states indexed by i. In each state there is one representative rich resident
who is immobile; there are also li poor that are mobile. The total number
of poor in the economy is ￿xed, i.e.
X
i
li = kl. (1)
States produce a private consumption good with a ricardian technology
f(li), which is increasing and concave (f0(li) > 0 and f00(li) < 0). Workers
are paid at their marginal productivity: wages in state i are w(li)=f0(li).
Note that wages in state i d e c r e a s ew i t ht h en u m b e ro fp o o ri nt h a ts t a t e :
w0(li)=f00(li) < 0.
The per capita transfer that accrues to the poor in state i is denoted
zi. The total income of a poor in state i is thus w(li)+zi. Since poor can
6M o r ed e t a i l sc a nb ef o u n di n[ 1 1 ]o r[ 1 2 ] .
3migrate costlessly from one state to another, necessarily:
c = w(li)+zi = w(lj)+zj, ∀j 6= i (2)
The rich resident captures the return to the ￿xed factors of production.
So the (gross) income of the rich in state i is
y(li)=f(li) − f0(li)li. (3)
This income is used to consume private good xi and to pay the tax τi so
that xi = y(li) − τi.
All states exhibit identical social welfare function W de￿n e do v e rt h e
consumption xi of their rich resident and the income c o ft h e i rp o o rr e s i -
dents, re￿ecting some (unexplained) motives for redistribution. The function
W(xi,c) is assumed to be quasiconcave and its (positive) partial derivatives
are denoted W1 and W2.
Fiscal revenue in each state τi serves to ￿nance the welfare bene￿ts to
its poor residents (1 − s)lizi, (net of the federal subsidies slizi)p l u st h e
federal tax T. Given our symmetric framework it is assumed that states
a r ea l lf a c i n gt h es a m em a t c h i n gr a t es ∈ [0,1[ and pay the same federal
contribution T. Hence, the state budget constraints are:
τi =( 1− s)li zi + T, i=1 ,...,k (4)
and the federal budget constraint is:
k X
i=1
sl i zi = kT (5)
3 Conditions for Pareto optimality
In this model any Pareto optimal allocation of labour has to maximise the
total output
P
f(li) which given identical technologies across states requires
workers to be evenly distributed ( i.e. li = l,s ot h a tf0(li)=f0(l) for all i).
Using this productive eﬃciency condition, Pareto optimal allocation must






4The necessary and suﬃcient ￿rst-order condition for the (interior) optimal






This is the familiar Samuelson condition for the eﬃcient provision of public
good. Given the public good property of the income of the poor, c,a ta n
interior solution we must have that the sum of the marginal bene￿ts from
raising the income of the poor is equal to its marginal cost.
4 Mobility externality and matching grants
4.1 No see through
In [12] it is assumed that states take the federal policy (T,s) as given and
choose simultaneoulsy and non-cooperatively the bene￿tl e v e l szi to their
poor residents with the tax rates τi being residually determined by the
resulting migrations to balance their budget (i.e., bene￿t competition). For-
mally, each state i takes the bene￿t levels of other states zj (j 6= i)a n dt h e
federal policy (T,s) as given and solves
max
zi
W (y(li) − τi,c)
subject to conditions (1),(2), (3) and (4).
We derive the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which (i) no poor wants
to migrate, (ii) no state wants to change its policy choice given the policy
choices of other states and the federal policy, (iii) the budget of every state is
balanced, and (iv) the federal budget is balanced.7 The ￿rst-order condition














where from (3), y0(li)=−lif00(li). The migration eﬀect of a change in zi
holding constant zj (for all j 6= i) is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating (1)
and (2) with respect to zi, li,l j which evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium
gives8
7In symmetric equilibrium, mobility does not aﬀect the allocation of population among
states, that is not to say, however, that it is irrelevant to the states￿ choice of redistributive
policies!











kw0 < 0 ∀j 6= i (9)
Diﬀerentiating both (2) and (4) with respect to zi , using (8) and sym-



















=( 1− sk)l − (1 − s)(k − 1)
z
w0
Comparing this condition with (6), it is readily seen that it is possible
to implement the ￿rst best solution as a Nash equilibrium by setting the
matching rate s such that the right hand side of this condition equates l.








where ε ≡ dlogl/dlogw = w/w0l<0 is the labor-demand elasticity evalu-
ated at the symmetric equilibrium. This is the classical matching grant as
derived in [12] for identical states (see Proposition 4). This result is obtained
by assuming that states take the federal policy as given and so behave as if
their policy choice had no in￿uence on the federal budget.
Now we relax this assumption and assume as in [3] that states can see
through the federal budget and take into account the eﬀect of their policy
choices on the federal tax T. Our purpose is to see how this see-through
assumption aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of matching grant and, in particular,
whether the general neutrality result of Bernheim applies in this model.
64.2 See through











State i￿s problem is the same as before except that the condition (4) is
replaced by (13).
The general expression for the ￿rst-order condition for state i is still
given by (7) where dli/dzi and dc/dzi are unchanged (resp., (8) and (10))






























where the second equality follows from (8) and (9). Using (8), (10) and (14),






s)kl − (1 − s)(k − 1)
z
w0 − (k − 1)l
Since ￿rst best requires the right-hand side of this expression to be equal






where ε = w/w0l<0 is used. Three conclusions emerge immediately. Firstly
matching grants can restore the ￿rst-best even if agents see through the
federal budget, so the neutrality result of Berheim does not apply. Secondly
a higher matching rate is required to correct the ￿scal externality under
the see-through assumption (i.e., e s◦ >s ◦). Thirdly, with see-through, the
number of states is irrelevant to the choice of the optimal matching rate. To
summarize.
Proposition 1: For any (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the bene￿t
competition game between k ≥ 1 states, matching grants can achieve the
7￿rst-best regardless of the see-through assumption. It only takes a higher
matching grant with see-through. Moreover the eﬀect of see-through is to
make the optimal matching rate independent of the number of competing
states.
In the next section we relax the assumption we have made so far that
states compete through bene￿t levels and instead assume that the policy
variable is the tax while the bene￿t levels are determined residually ac-
cording to migration to maintain budget balance. Again our purpose is to
show how the see through assumption aﬀects the optimal matching rate and
whether there is a possibility of neutrality.
5T a x c o m p e t i t i o n
5.1 No see through
State i selects a tax τi taking the tax rates of other states τj (j 6= i)a n d
the federal policy (T,s) as given so as to solve
max
τi
W (y(li) − τi,c)




for all i (15)












The migration eﬀect of a change in τi holding constant T, s,a n dτj
(with j 6= i) is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to











k(1 − s)(z − w0l)
< 0 ∀j 6= i (18)
8So, matching grants amplify the migration response to tax change. Dif-







Plugging (17), (19) into (16) and using the fact that y0 = −lf00 = −lw0
in a symmetric equilibrium, we get
W2
W1




Comparing this condition with (6), restoring the ￿r s tb e s ts o l u t i o nr e -
quires to set the matching rate such that the right hand side of this condition







Note that s∗ <s ◦ which means that tax competition requires a lower
matching grant to restore eﬃciency than bene￿t competition. The reason
is that competition in taxes is less severe because increasing tax in one
state holding the tax rates in other states constant, attracts some of the
poor in that state enabling the other states to raise their bene￿t levels. So
more redistribution in one state triggers more redistribution in other states;
while under bene￿t competition more redistribution in one state triggers
less taxation in other states (see [8] and [13] for similar result). It is worth
noting that as k → +∞ the two games require the same matching rate. In
fact, from (10) and (19), dc/dzi = dc/dτi → 0 as k → +∞ so that tax
change has the same negligible eﬀect on the income of the poor as bene￿t
change when the number of states is very large.9 We thus have,
Proposition 2: With non-see-through, the matching grants required to
attain the ￿rst-best depend on the the states￿ choice of policy variable. Com-
petition in taxes requires lower matching grants than competition in bene￿t
levels. In both cases optimal matching grants are increasing with the number
of competing states and converge to the same level e s◦ = 1
1− w
zε
as k →∞ .
We now allow for see-through in this tax competition game.
9See also [13] for a similar result in the context of capital mobility.
95.2 See through
Substituting (5) for T into (4) ,





lj zj for all i
Summing these k identities
k X
j=1
τj =( 1 − s)
k X
j=1








Combining these two expressions





τj for all i










(1 − s) li
for all i (21)
State￿s problem is the same as without see through asumption except that
the condition (15) is replaced by (21).
Totally diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to τi, li,l j using (21),











k(1 − s)(z − w0l)
< 0 ∀j 6= i (23)
Note that under tax competition, the migration eﬀects of a tax change are
the same with or without the see-through assumption (see (17) and (18)).























Note again that dc/dτi → 0 as the number of jurisdictions increases to
in￿nity. Reporting (22) and (24) into the ￿rst order condition (16), using





k(1 − s)(z − w0l)
]kl
Restoring the ￿rst-best requires to choose s such that the right-hand side of
this expression equates l. This yields the following matching grant.




So with see-through, the optimal matching grant is the same whether
states compete in taxes or in bene￿ts. This was true with non-see-through
only in the limiting case of an in￿nite number of states. Note that the
optimal matching rate is also independent of the number of states. Lastly
simple comparison of the matching rates reveals that e s∗ = k
k−1s∗ so that
optimal matching rates under see-through may be up to twice the matching
rate without see through. Therefore we have
Proposition 3: With see-through the optimal matching grant is the
same whether states compete in taxes or in bene￿t levels and is independent
of the number of states. This matching grant may be up to twice the matching
grant without see through.
The key to the diﬀerent results in the Bernheim and our model, as out-
lined in the introduction, is that in the Bernheim model contributions are
chosen after labour supply and thus are not distortionary at all; whereas
in our model contributions are chosen before labour supply is determined
through the resulting migration. To understand the critical role of this
distortion, suppose that states do not care about productive eﬃciency. It
11follows that states do not take into account the distortionary eﬀect of their
policy choices on the allocation of labour. This can be easily captured in
our model by assuming that y0 =0 . Plugging this value into the ￿rst-order




So, the ￿rst-order condition would be now independent of the matching
rate s and the neutrality result would follow.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analysed the eﬀectiveness of matching grants to correct for
interjurisdictional spillovers due to mobility. We have used a classical model
of welfare competition in which states seek to redistribute income but face
a mobility constraint. The model shares the properties of private contribu-
tion to public good models since with mobility, by arbitrage all states end
up with the same level of income for the poor. It follows that redistribution
of income in each state is akin to the voluntary contribution of a public good
(namely, the income of the poor). The Nash equilibrium involves too few re-
distribution and a subsidy policy like matching grants can be used to restore
the Pareto optimal outcome. However, unlike the previous papers having
investigated this issue, we have allowed for the (reasonable) possibility that
states take into account the impact of their decisions on the federal budget
(i.e., see through assumption). Because states fully take into account the
taxes they will have to pay as a result of the subsidies they receive, and
because all states are linked through their voluntary contributions to public
good, it is natural to wonder whether Berhneim general neutrality result,
based on these two assumptions, would apply. Our analysis reveals that the
answer is no. Matching grants are not neutral in our model although the see-
through assumption make them much less eﬀective. So we do not have that
federal policy change triggers oﬀsetting changes from states. The reason is
that, with mobility, oﬀsetting change in states￿ contributions to public good
is distortionary as it aﬀects the allocation of labour. In contrast, Berhneim
neutrality relies on the assumption that voluntary contributions are not dis-
tortionary because labour supply is determined before contributions. To put
it diﬀerently, mobility invalidates the key assumption in Berhneim theorem
that: agents (states) care about the magnitude of their contributions only
12insofar as these contributions aﬀect the aggregate level of public good. In
our model contributions also aﬀect the allocation of labour and economic
rent in each state.
Our analysis has also revealed some other interesting results. In particu-
lar, we have shown that, contrary to conventional results, the states￿ choice
of policy variable (i.e., competing in taxes or competing in bene￿ts) and
the number of competing jurisdiction are irrelevant for the calculation of
optimal matching grants. Previous work rather suggests that competition
increases with the number of jurisdictions and that bene￿tc o m p e t i t i o ni s
more severe than tax competition, and so that higher matching grants are
needed. The key to the diﬀerent results is that we allow for states to take
into account the impact of their decision on the federal budget which is a
sensible assumption when there are only few states. Not too surprisingly, we
have also found that this see-through assumption is becoming decreasingly
relevant as the number of states increases.
Attention has been restricted in our analysis to identical jurisdictions
and symmetric Nash equilibrium to ensure that any matching grants emerge
solely from eﬃciency grounds. We have thus abstracted from the heterogene-
ity neutralising and risk sharing eﬀect of matching grants. For the distortion
reason already outlined we can expect the non neutrality result of matching
grants to carry over in a more general model of heterogenous states provided
there is mobility of factors. We have also abstracted from the possibility of
using block grants instead of matching grants. This is a contentious issue
that may be worth investigating in future research.
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